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ABSTRACT
Objective: The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
recently revised their HIV screening guidelines to promote testing and
earlier entry to care. Prior analyses have examined the policy’s cost-
effectiveness but have not evaluated its impact on government budgets.
Methods: We used a simulation model of HIV screening, disease, and
treatment to determine the budget impact of expanded HIV screening to
US government discretionary, entitlement, and testing programs. We esti-
mated total and incremental testing and treatment costs over a 5-year time
horizon under current and expanded screening scenarios. We used CDC
estimates of HIV prevalence and annual incidence, and considered varia-
tions in screening frequency, test return rates, linkage to care, test charac-
teristics, and eligibility for government screening and treatment programs.
Results: Under current practice, 177,000 new HIV cases will be identiﬁed
over 5 years. Expanded screening will identify an additional 46,000 cases
at an incremental 5-year cost of $2.7 billion. The ﬁnancial burden of
expanded HIV screening will fall disproportionately on discretionary pro-
grams that fund care for newly identiﬁed patients and will not be offset by
entitlement program savings. Testing will represent a small proportion
(18%) of the total budget increase. Costs are sensitive to the frequency of
screening and the proportion linked to care.
Conclusions: The expanded HIV screening program will have a large
downstream impact on government programs that fund HIV care.
Expanded HIV screening will not meet early treatment goals unless gov-
ernment programs have sufﬁcient budgets to expand testing and provide
care for newly identiﬁed cases.
Keywords: AIDS, budget impact analysis, computer simulation, cost
analysis.
Introduction
In September 2006, the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) revised their HIV screening guidelines to
increase rates of detection and facilitate early entry into care.
Beneﬁts of earlier detection and entry into care include better
outcomes for patients themselves and lowered rates of HIV trans-
mission to others because of biological (decreased infectivity as a
result of treatment) and behavioral (reductions in risk behavior
due to knowledge and counseling) mechanisms [1–4]. The
revised CDC guidelines encourage routine testing in all health-
care settings for the general population and annual testing for
high-risk populations [5]. Nevertheless, ﬁnancing concerns are a
major barrier to implementing the recommendations [6]. If gov-
ernment testing and care programs are underfunded, expanded
screening may result in large numbers of newly identiﬁed cases
who are unable to receive care.
The CDC considered cost-effectiveness evaluations of
expanded screening policies in its recent decision [7]. Previous
analyses have indicated that expanded HIV screening is cost-
effective in many settings [8–10] and alternative targeted screen-
ing strategies have also been advocated on efﬁciency grounds
[11]. Nevertheless, efﬁcient policies may not be affordable from a
payer’s perspective if the stream of ﬁnancial costs is larger than
budget allocations [12]. The budget requirements for govern-
ment programs to provide HIV testing and appropriate medical
care to the entire eligible US population are unknown [11]. It is
unclear how expanded screening in the US may differentially
affect discretionary government programs funded by ﬁxed
annual appropriations versus entitlement programs with budgets
that automatically expand as demand increases. This question is
particularly timely given the recent reauthorization legislation in
the US Congress for the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program (RW),
and passage of health-care reform legislation.
We conducted a budget impact analysis of expanded HIV
screening using a published simulation model of HIV screening,
disease, and treatment and national data on HIV epidemiology,
enrollment in public health-care programs, and program eligibil-
ity. We forecasted the impact on government budgets for testing
programs, discretionary treatment programs (such as RW), and
entitlement programs (Medicaid and Medicare) under current
practice and expanded screening scenarios over a 5-year period.
We excluded patients covered by the Veterans Administration
(VA) because the VA has a distinct single-payer system. We also
excluded patients with private insurance to focus on government
budgets.
Overview of HIV Finance in the United States
The predominant sources of government funding for HIV care in
the United States are the federal-funded Medicare and federal-
and state-funded Medicaid entitlement programs, and the discre-
tionary RW [13–16]. Although speciﬁc eligibility criteria vary
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across states, HIV-infected individuals generally qualify for Med-
icaid after they meet low-income and “disability” criteria. Indi-
viduals with sufﬁcient work experience may qualify for Medicare
by reaching age 65 or meeting income and “permanent disabil-
ity” standards [15]. RW is mandated to be a “payer of last
resort” and targets uninsured and underinsured HIV-infected
individuals, particularly those who have not yet progressed to
AIDS. Its federal budget is set annually by Congress, and some
state legislatures provide supplementary annual appropriations.
The largest components of RW spending are state-administered
AIDS Drug Assistance Programs (ADAPs), which ﬁnance HIV
medications [14,17]. We distinguish between discretionary and
entitlement programs in our budget impact analysis because
entitlement program budgets automatically expand in response
to increased case load. Because of their discretionary structure,
RW budgets are more vulnerable to unexpected increases in the
number eligible for care.
HIV patient eligibility for public insurance programs ﬂuctu-
ates over time. Patients detected early in their disease may not
initially meet disability criteria to qualify for Medicare or Med-
icaid; however, they may later transition from a discretionary to
an entitlement program with age or development of symptomatic
illness. In contrast, patients identiﬁed late in their disease may be
immediately eligible for an entitlement program.
Methods
Analytic Overview
Wherever possible, we adhered to the ISPOR guidelines on
budget impact analysis [12]. We used a published Monte Carlo
state transition simulation model of HIV testing, disease, and
treatment to estimate incremental testing and treatment costs for
prevalent and incident cohorts of HIV-infected individuals over a
5-year time horizon. The testing cost calculations also include the
cost of screening noninfected individuals. In conformity with the
ISPOR principles [12], we selected a planning horizon that
reﬂects the time frames used for budget planning in publicly
ﬁnanced HIV care [18]. Our baseline horizon of 5 years matches
the 3 to 5-year interval typical of RW reauthorizations. Recog-
nizing that some readers may be interested in the budget impact
over a longer time horizon, we also consider a 10-year horizon in
a sensitivity analysis. We examined two testing strategies: current
practice (deﬁned by completing a test, on average, every 10 years)
and expanded screening (deﬁned by completing a test, on
average, every 5 years), and evaluated alternative testing frequen-
cies in sensitivity analyses. The derivation of the testing time
frames is described next. We also examined alternatives for the
type of test, rate of return for test results and linkage to care, and
likelihood of qualifying for a government testing and care
program.
We report the following outcomes: the number identiﬁed over
5 years, the fraction of cases identiﬁed through presentation to
care with testing versus clinical AIDS, mean CD4 count at diag-
nosis (a measure of immune function), the incremental quality-
adjusted life-years, and costs to government programs. Costs
were forecasted separately for programs that pay for HIV testing,
discretionary treatment programs (including federal RW funds,
state matching funds, and uncompensated care pools), and
entitlement treatment programs (Medicare and Medicaid).
National data on health insurance coverage and HIV epide-
miology were used to estimate the proportion of cases eligible for
discretionary and entitlement programs at the time of HIV detec-
tion and over the subsequent 5 years. We report undiscounted
dollar outlays in each budget period in 2009 dollars, which is
consistent with ISPOR’s recommendation to report undiscounted
costs [12,19].
Populations and Program Eligibility
We focused on adults (>18 years) because of our objective to
project costs to RW, Medicaid, Medicare, and uncompensated
care pools. Although RW does fund some services for children
and youth, these funds represent a small percentage of overall
RW grants [20]. The federal and state-funded State Children’s
Health Insurance Program would likely incur most of the costs of
treating newly identiﬁed HIV cases among children and adoles-
cents, and is not included in our budget analysis. Additionally,
the clinical parameters in our model are derived from adult
populations.
We tracked HIV-related treatment costs for all adults, includ-
ing the elderly. We excluded testing costs for elderly adults (>64
years) because neither past screening efforts nor the revised
guidelines target this group [5]. All cost calculations also
excluded patients for whom testing and treatment costs were
likely to be ﬁnanced through the VA or private insurance.
We used national estimates of insurance status to estimate the
total number of nonelderly adults (aged 19–64 years) without
private or VA insurance who would be eligible to receive HIV
tests through a government testing program [21,22]. For model-
ing purposes, we assumed that only those eligible for public
sector-ﬁnanced care (excluding VA coverage) would receive a
public sector-ﬁnanced test. Sensitivity analyses include scenarios
where additional costs are incurred by government programs to
test or eventually treat individuals who are currently insured
through private insurance or the VA. We used 2008 national HIV
incidence data (approximately 56,000 new cases annually) [23]
to project the total number of HIV-infected individuals poten-
tially eligible for testing and linkage to care upon diagnosis. We
used national HIV prevalence data (approximately 1.1 million
prevalent cases, of whom 21% do not know their infection
status) [24] to calculate the number of prevalent cases currently
aware of their infection and eligible for care. These data were
also used to estimate the number of undetected prevalent cases
potentially eligible for testing and linkage to care upon diagnosis.
We assumed a constant incidence of new infections over the
5-year period [23]. We estimated the fraction of all cases
(detected and undetected) likely to qualify for government dis-
cretionary and entitlement programs using data from the HIV
Research Network (HIVRN) [25]. We used data on the incidence
and prevalence of HIV among veterans to subtract those likely to
receive care through the VA from our population estimates [26].
Our calculations yield the following populations eligible for
government-ﬁnanced testing and treatment in 2009: 50,100,000
HIV-negative individuals; 711,000 prevalent cases aware of their
infection; 189,000 undetected prevalent cases; and 46,000 inci-
dent cases. Further details of these calculations are provided in
the technical appendix at: http://www.ispor.org/Publications/
value/ViHsupplementary/ViH13i8_Martin.asp.
We assumed that treatment costs for newly diagnosed indi-
viduals without private or VA insurance are ﬁnanced through
discretionary programs until they qualify for Medicare by attain-
ing age 65 or they experience an AIDS-deﬁning opportunistic
infection (OI), thereby qualifying them for Medicaid or Medi-
care. Newly diagnosed individuals may be immediately eligible
for entitlement programs before presentation with an OI due to
pregnancy, prior disability, or state-speciﬁc poverty-level expan-
sions [14,27]. Because national estimates of this population are
unavailable and the number is likely to be small, we did not
account for such eligibility.
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Table 1 displays the data sources used to generate demo-
graphic and clinical characteristics of cases eligible for govern-
ment care upon diagnosis. We used a different set of
characteristics for HIV-infected individuals in the three cohorts
(prevalent aware, prevalent unaware, and incident cases).
The mean age, gender, and CD4 distribution for the prevalent
aware cohort were obtained from summary data of all patients in
the HIVRN study [28]. We assumed that before ART, the distri-
bution of viral loads after acute HIV infection for each CD4
stratum was similar to that of the Multicenter AIDS Cohort
Study (MACS) cohort [29]. We determined the distribution of
prior OIs for each CD4 stratum through an initialization cohort,
in which we simulated healthy cohorts with the same mean age
and gender proportions until they reached each CD4 stratum
[30]. We assigned these patients to discretionary and entitlement
programs based on insurance status reported in HIVRN.
By deﬁnition, demographic characteristics of prevalent
unaware cases are unknown. We assumed that the age and
gender of “prevalent unaware” cases were similar to that of
“prevalent aware” cases. Untreated disease lasts on average 10
Table 1 Inputs and source data for simulation model to project budget impact of expanded HIV screening to public payers
Variable Base-case (Range) Sources
General
Discount rate 0% [12]
Number of HIV-negative individuals who will be screened,
at start of simulation
N* 50,100,000 (upper 55,100,000) See appendix†
Characteristics of prevalent cases aware of their infection‡
N* 711,000 (upper 747,000) See appendix†
Age (mean) 41 years [28]
Female 30% [24,28] and T. Westmoreland, pers. comm.
CD4 at simulation entry (mean, std) 390 (260) cells/mm3 [28]
Viral load Published natural history data [29], see appendix†
Prior OI experience Published natural history data [29], see appendix†
Characteristics of prevalent cases unaware of their infection§
N* 189,000 (upper 198,000) See appendix†
Age (mean) 41 years [28]
Female 30% [28]
CD4 at simulation entry (mean, std) Published natural history data [29,31], see appendix†
Viral load Published natural history data [29], see appendix†
Prior OI experience None Assumption
Characteristics of incident cases¶
N* 45,800 per year (upper 48,100) See appendix†
Age (mean) 33 years [32], see appendix†
Female 30% [46]
CD4 at simulation entry (mean, std) 534 (164) cells/mm3 [31]
Viral load >100,000 copies/mL Assumption, see appendix†
Prior OI experience None Assumption, see appendix†
Test characteristics
Probability of monthly test receipt
Current practice (%) 0.83% (0–1.67%) [49]
Expanded (%) 1.67% (0.83–8.33%) See text
Probability detected case linked to care** 80% (50–100%) [40,53,54]
Rapid test characteristics
Sensitivity preseroconversion 0.1% Calculated
Sensitivity postseroconversion 99.6% [63]
Speciﬁcity postseroconversion 99.9% [64]
HIV-positive test return rate 97% (90–100%) [52]
HIV-negative test return rate 97% (90–100%) [52]
ELISA test characteristics
Sensitivity preseroconversion 0.1% Calculated
Sensitivity postseroconversion 99.6% [64]
Speciﬁcity postseroconversion 99.9% [64]
HIV-positive test return rate 75% (50–100%) [52]
HIV-negative test return rate 67% (50–100%) [52]
Testing costs
HIV test kit, administration, and laboratory analysis
Rapid test $12.23 [37]
ELISA $7.05 [37]
Conﬁrmatory testing for positive results
Rapid test $44.28 [37]
ELISA $52.72 [37]
Pretest counseling $0 ($7.76) [37]
Post-test counseling for negative test result $7.53 [37]
Post-test linkage and counseling for positive test result $14.61 [37]
Administrative cost for nonreturn for results $9.02 Assumption (0.5 h of administrative staff time
and $1.00 for mail and phone reminders)
*All calculations exclude individuals eligible for testing and care through the Veterans Administration or private insurance.
†Assumption; technical appendix at: http://www.ispor.org/Publications/value/ViHsupplementary/ViH13i8_Martin.asp.
‡Aware is deﬁned as aware of their infection and currently in care through discretionary or entitlement programs, at the start of the simulation.
§Unaware is deﬁned as being unaware of their infection at the start of the simulation, and only eligible for government-ﬁnanced care upon detection.
¶Incident cases are uninfected at the start of the simulation, and are only eligible for government-ﬁnanced care upon detection.
**See technical appendix at: http://www.ispor.org/Publications/value/ViHsupplementary/ViH13i8_Martin.asp for a more detailed description of the linkage to care probability and the test return
rate.
ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; OI, opportunistic infection; std, standard.
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years (120 months), of which the ﬁrst 2 months are in the acute
state, the last 2 years (24 months) are in the symptomatic chronic
state, and the remainder of time (94 months) is spent in the
asymptomatic chronic state. An undetected patient thereby had a
1.7% chance of being in the acute state (in 2 of 120), 78.3%
chance of being in the asymptomatic chronic state (in 96 of 120),
and 20% chance of being in the symptomatic chronic state (in 24
of 120) [8,10]. The mean CD4 distribution of acute cases was
estimated from published studies of individuals with primary
infection [31], and the mean CD4 distribution of chronic cases
was estimated from the MACS cohort [29]. We assumed that no
patients had a history of OIs, as they otherwise would have been
identiﬁed and linked to care upon presentation.
It is difﬁcult to derive population characteristics of incident
cases because these cases are not immediately detected. We
derived the mean age of new cases through back calculation. Past
research has estimated that on average, there is a duration of 8
years between infection and presentation to care [32]. We sub-
tracted this value from data on prevalent cases to calculate the
mean age of 33 years for the incident cohort [10]. All individuals
in this cohort entered the model at the time of infection, during
an acute state of illness. Clinical characteristics included no OI
history and a very high viral load (>100,000 copies/mL). The
mean CD4 distribution of this cohort was estimated from pub-
lished studies of individuals with primary infection [31]. After
individuals progressed past the acute state (approximately 2
months), their viral load decreased and patients were moved to a
lower viral load stratum. The viral load distribution was derived
from the MACS cohort [29].
Model Description
The Cost-Effectiveness of Preventing AIDS Complications
(CEPAC) Model is a widely published computer simulation of
HIV disease and treatment [8,33–35]. It contains two compo-
nents. The Screening Module simulates an HIV screening
program and determines when each simulated HIV-infected
patient will become detected through testing or presentation to
care with an AIDS-deﬁning OI. For those detected through
testing, the Screening Module additionally determines whether
they were effectively linked to care. The Disease Module tracks
the clinical progress of all patients, irrespective of whether they
have been detected; however, only patients that have been suc-
cessfully detected and linked to care through testing or AIDS-
deﬁning presentation are eligible for treatment.
The Screening Module allows user-deﬁned inputs on test
characteristics, testing frequency, linkage to care, and costs. We
simulated cohorts of currently unidentiﬁed incident and preva-
lent cases likely to qualify for government care upon detection, as
described previously.
In the base-case, patients were screened using the rapid HIV
test. Many health departments have implemented rapid tests, and
there is evidence of a shift from conventional (enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay [ELISA]) to rapid technologies [36]
because patients can receive preliminary results at the time of
testing.
The Disease Module uses a Monte Carlo state-transition
framework to track the natural history of illness in simulated
patients with user-speciﬁed care. Data sources and details are
described in the technical appendix at: http://www.ispor.org/
Publications/value/ViHsupplementary/ViH13i8_Martin.asp.
Simulated patients undergo monthly transitions among health
states, categorized by chronic illness, acute illness, and death.
Monthly probabilities of events include changes in CD4 counts
and HIV viral load, the development of an OI, adverse drug
reactions, and death related to OIs, chronic AIDS, or non-AIDS-
related causes. Summary statistics are collected for each simu-
lated patient on age, mean projected survival, cause of death,
OIs, the length of time spent in each health state, and cost.
Simulated patients may receive antiretroviral therapy, medica-
tions for treatment and prevention of OIs, and ongoing routine
care.
Cost Inputs
Table 1 summarizes the sources used to tabulate costs. We
adapted testing costs from a recent analysis conducted by CDC
researchers [37], which updates earlier studies [38,39]. Cost esti-
mates are consistent with recent literature that reports economic
outcomes of HIV testing in emergency departments [40–43]. All
screened individuals were assigned the cost of the test, irrespec-
tive of their HIV status. Those with preliminary positive tests
(true and false positives) additionally incurred the cost of a
conﬁrmatory test. All individuals were assigned the cost of post-
test counseling, which differed by test result. Post-test counseling
costs for HIV-infected persons included costs to facilitate linkage
to care. Not all individuals received their test results; those who
did not receive them did not incur costs for conﬁrmatory testing
and post-test counseling.
Prior to the CDC’s revised screening guidelines, pretest coun-
seling was encouraged. The current guidelines promote opt-out
testing, without separate written consent and pretest counseling
[5,7]. In practice, legal requirements for pretest counseling and
written consent vary by state [44]. Furthermore, some testing
sites may continue to offer pretest counseling in the absence of a
requirement. To simulate the CDC guidelines as closely as pos-
sible, we excluded pretest counseling costs from the base-case
analysis of both screening scenarios. We included these costs in a
sensitivity analysis, and we assumed that providers’ decisions to
offer pretest counseling were independent of the testing fre-
quency. The CDC’s revised recommendations for opt-out testing
are controversial [6,11]. We assumed that if individuals who did
not receive pretest counseling changed their risk behavior, the
cost impact to government programs would be minimal in our
5-year time frame, although they may become signiﬁcant in
future years.
Pharmaceutical costs were calculated using published average
wholesale prices [45], which were adjusted for the average state
Medicaid reimbursement rate by weighting state-speciﬁc Medic-
aid discounts by AIDS prevalence [46]. Costs of laboratory tests
were derived from the Medicare fee schedule [47]. Medical care
utilization of patients at different stages of HIV disease was
obtained from data collected by the HIVRN [46]. Costs of inpa-
tient services were derived from the University HealthSystem
Consortium database [46,48].
Health-Care Cost Projections
We conducted separate simulations for three groups of patients
and aggregated the results. The ﬁrst group is the 711,000 preva-
lent cases eligible for entitlement and discretionary programs and
receiving care in 2009. The second group is the 189,000 preva-
lent cases whose infection is undetected in 2009 and who will not
incur costs to the government programs until they are detected
and linked to care. The third group is the 46,000 incident cases
eligible for government care each year, who will also only incur
treatment costs upon detection and linkage to care.
Screening Strategies
To model current practice, we estimated that on average, indi-
viduals receive a test every 10 years, equivalent to a 0.83%
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chance of being tested each month and 5.0 million tests annually.
This estimate is derived from a CDC analysis of national health
data surveys [49], although other surveys suggest that current
screening rates may be higher [50]. We validated our estimate by
comparing our model results to CDC estimates that 39% of
HIV-infected individuals received an AIDS diagnosis within a
year of their ﬁrst HIV test [51]. We found that our current
practice of once every 10 years reasonably approximated these
data on late presentation to care.
To model expanded screening, we assumed that on average,
individuals are offered and accept a test every 5 years, equivalent
to a 1.67% monthly chance of testing and 10.0 million tests
annually. This represents a twofold increase in testing from
current practice. Although this test rate does not match the
CDC’s recommendation for routine screening in the general
population and repeat annual testing for high-risk populations
[5], we believe that it best represents the population effect of
reasonable efforts to implement the policy. Prior analyses of
expanded HIV testing have also used a 5-year testing frame [8,9].
In the base-case for current practice and expanded screening,
we assumed that 97% of patients received their rapid test result
[52], and that 80% of all identiﬁed cases were successfully linked
to care [53,54].
Sensitivity Analyses
To examine if our results were robust to parameter uncertainty,
we conducted extensive sensitivity analyses, listed in Table 1.
One set of analyses used the ELISA test, which differs from the
rapid test with respect to costs and the rate of receipt of test
results. We varied the testing frequency, from a minimum of “no
testing” to a maximum of “annual testing.” We varied the rate
of receipt of rapid test results from 90% to 100%, and receipt of
ELISA results from 50% to 100%. We estimated a range of
linkage to care probabilities (for identiﬁed cases who had
received their results), from perfect linkage (100%) to 50%
linkage. We assessed the cost impact of including pretest coun-
seling. We calculated the impact of a 10% increase in the popu-
lation eligible for government-ﬁnanced testing and care if
additional costs are incurred by government programs to test and
treat individuals who are currently privately insured but have
incomplete coverage or lose coverage in the future. Finally, we
considered a 10-year time horizon.
Results
Table 2 displays clinical characteristics of newly identiﬁed HIV-
infected adults eligible for government-ﬁnanced testing and care
(excluding the VA), for the base-case of each screening scenario.
If testing continues at an average frequency of once every 10
years, 177,000 cases (116,000 prevalent; 61,000 incident) will be
identiﬁed from 2009 to 2013. Over the course of their lifespan,
68% of currently unidentiﬁed prevalent cases and 49% of inci-
dent cases will receive a diagnosis after presenting to care with an
AIDS-deﬁning OI. If expanded testing increases testing to once
every 5 years, an additional 46,000 cases (17,000 prevalent;
29,000 incident) will be identiﬁed from 2009 to 2013. The
fraction of cases receiving a diagnosis as a result of an AIDS-
deﬁning OI will drop to 58% and 32% for prevalent and incident
cases, respectively. The mean CD4 count at detection (a measure
of HIV disease progression) will be higher under expanded
screening for all cases, reﬂecting earlier detection.
Table 3 lists the projected total testing and care costs to public
payers, under each screening scenario. Costs are separated by
program type (testing, discretionary, and entitlement) and then
summed at the bottom of the table. In the base-case, continued
testing at the current rate will incur a total cost of $83.7 billion
over 5 years. Expanded screening will incur an additional cost of
$2.7 billion, for a total of $86.4 billion. Five-year testing costs
will increase from $504 million to $1.0 billion. Budget projec-
tions are dominated by treatment costs. Testing costs represent a
small fraction of total costs (0.6 and 1.2% for the current prac-
tice and expanded screening scenarios, respectively) and 18.3%
of additional costs for expanded screening. Five-year projected
costs to discretionary programs will increase by $2.9 billion
(from $26.0 billion to $28.9 billion), which will be partially
offset by a savings of $624 million in the entitlement program
budget. In both scenarios, most costs will be incurred by entitle-
ment programs.
Under a 10-year time horizon, 158,000 cases will be identi-
ﬁed under current practice (19,000 prevalent; 139,000 incident)
in the second 5-year period from 2014 to 2018. Over time, an
increasing number of incident cases are identiﬁed via current
practice as they progress through HIV disease and develop OIs.
Nevertheless, continuing expanded screening for the additional 5
years yields an additional 31,000 cases identiﬁed between 2014
and 2018. Compared to current practice, expanded screening
will yield incremental costs of $1.1 billion to testing programs
and $10.9 billion to discretionary programs, and incremental
savings of $2.8 billion to entitlement programs.
Figure 1 shows annual incremental costs for people identiﬁed
through expanded screening. In each budget year, expanded
screening would incur an additional screening program cost of
approximately $101 million. This incremental cost remains con-
Table 2 Clinical characteristics of newly detected HIV-infected individu-
als eligible for care through discretionary and entitlement programs*
Current
practice
Expanded
screening
Number identiﬁed over a 5-year period
Prevalent cases in year 1 (N) 54,343 63,747
Prevalent cases in year 2 (N) 18,362 24,062
Prevalent cases in year 3 (N) 17,276 19,755
Prevalent cases in year 4 (N) 14,759 15,106
Prevalent cases in year 5 (N) 11,366 10,651
Total prevalent cases in period (N) 116,107 133,321
Incident cases in year 1 (N) 4,099 6,701
Incident cases in year 2 (N) 8,379 13,258
Incident cases in year 3 (N) 12,340 18,764
Incident cases in year 4 (N) 16,086 23,417
Incident cases in year 5 (N) 19,618 27,361
Total incident cases in period (N) 60,523 89,501
Mechanism of detection, prevalent cases
Screening (%) 19.7 33.1
Opportunistic infection (%) 68.3 57.8
Never detected (%) 12.0 9.1
Mechanism of detection, incident cases
Screening (%) 39.3 60.2
Opportunistic infection (%) 49.0 32.3
Never detected (%) 11.7 7.5
CD4 count at detection
Prevalent (mean cells/mm3) 122 140
Incident (mean cells/mm3) 251 312
Incremental quality-adjusted survival per person†
Prevalent cases (DQALYs) — 2.0
Incident cases (DQALYs) — 3.2
*Clinical characteristics are different fromTable 1 input parameters.Table 1 input parameters
refer to the actual but unobserved characteristics at the start of the simulation.Table 2 input
parameters refer to observed clinical characteristics upon detection. CD4 counts are lower
inTable 2 because it takes time for HIV-infected cases to become detected, during which time
CD4 counts generally fall.“Prevalent aware” cases are not included in this table because they
have already been detected.
†These numbers refer to the quality-adjusted survival over the newly detected cases’
lifetime, and not just the 5-year time horizon of the budget impact analysis.
QALYs, quality-adjusted life-years.
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stant. The projected annual incremental cost of care to discre-
tionary budgets would rise throughout the period, from $133
million in 2009 to $983 million in 2013. Entitlement programs
will experience cost savings, which will increase over time. We
project annual savings of $2 million in 2009 and $280 million in
2013. Incremental costs to discretionary programs are not fully
offset by cost savings to entitlement programs.
Figure 2 displays the projected pharmaceutical costs to dis-
cretionary programs under current and expanded screening in
comparison to the 2007 RW ADAP budget (inﬂated to $2009),
including federal and state contributions [17]. In the ﬁrst year,
pharmaceutical costs to discretionary programs would be about
$3.2 billion under both scenarios, in comparison to the 2007
ADAP budget of $1.5 billion. By 2013, the annual pharmaceu-
tical cost would increase by $0.2 billion under current screening
and $0.8 billion under expanded screening.
Results of sensitivity analyses are shown in Table 3. Using
ELISA tests will decrease testing costs to $384 million and $766
million for current practice and expanded screening, because of
the lower test cost and return rate. Inclusion of pretest counseling
will increase testing costs to $699 million and $1.4 billion for
current practice and expanded screening. Perfect rates of test
return and linkage to care would increase total care costs to
$83.8 billion for current practice ($26.9 billion discretionary;
$56.9 billion entitlement) and $86.5 billion for expanded screen-
ing ($30.3 billion discretionary; $56.2 billion entitlement). Low
rates of test return and linkage to care would decrease total care
costs to $82.1 billion for current practice ($24.6 billion discre-
tionary; $57.5 billion entitlement) and $83.5 billion for
expanded screening ($26.5 billion discretionary; $57.0 billion
entitlement).
Combining these sensitivity analyses, we estimate that the
high-cost scenario (rapid test with pretest counseling and perfect
rates of test return and linkage to care) will incur total testing and
care costs of $84.5 billion and $87.9 billion for current practice
and expanded screening, for an incremental cost of $3.4 billion.
The low-cost scenario (ELISA test with no pretest counseling and
low rates of test return and linkage to care) will incur total costs
of $82.4 billion and $84.3 billion for current practice and
expanded screening, for an incremental cost of $1.9 billion.
If there is a 10% increase in the population eligible for
government-ﬁnanced testing and care, total costs will increase to
$92.0 billion under current practice and $95.1 billion under
expanded screening, for an incremental cost of $3.0 billion.
Discussion
Both cost-effectiveness and budget impact analysis can inform
policy decisions [12,55,56]. Because of the fragmented US
health-care delivery system, the societal perspective used in cost
Table 3 Projected 5-year costs (in millions) to US government testing, discretionary, and entitlement programs for HIV screening and care, 2009 to 2013
Total 5-year government budget impact (millions)
Current
practice ($)
Expanded
screening ($)
Incremental
cost ($)
Government-ﬁnanced testing programs
Base-case (rapid test) 504.2 1,006.8 502.6
ELISA test 383.6 766.4 382.7
Inclusion of pretest counseling 699.1 1,396.5 697.4
Discretionary programs
Base-case 26,030.0 28,899.1 2,869.1
Perfect rates of test return and linkage to care 26,897.9 30,319.7 3,421.9
Low rates of test return and linkage to care* 24,611.1 26,518.5 1,907.4
Entitlement programs
Base-case 57,128.4 56,504.8 -623.6
Perfect rates of test return and linkage to care 56,938.5 56,196.2 -742.3
Low rates of test return and linkage to care* 57,451.9 57,030.9 -421.0
Total costs
Base-case 83,662.6 86,410.7 2,748.1
Ten percent increase in eligible population 92,028.9 95,051.7 3,022.9
High-cost scenario† 84,535.5 87,912.4 3,376.9
Low-cost scenario‡ 82,446.6 84,315.8 1,869.2
*80% test return rate; 50% linkage to care probability.
†Rapid test with pretest counseling and perfect rates of test return and linkage to care.
‡ELISA test with no pretest counseling and low rates of test return and linkage to care.
ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay.
-$400
-$200
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Year
C
o
st
 (
in
 m
ill
io
n
s)
Testing
Discretionary
Entitlement
Figure 1 Incremental costs (in millions) to US
government testing, discretionary, and entitlement
programs, comparing current practice and
expanded screening, 2009 to 2013.
898 Martin et al.
effectiveness analysis (CEA) may not apply to public payers.
Health-care dollars are often earmarked for speciﬁc purposes,
and decision-makers have limited capacity to determine how and
when to spend budgets.
The CDC considered economic evidence in formulating its
recent recommendation to increase HIV testing in routine care
[7] but did not estimate total costs [11]. Peer-reviewed literature
has described the potential of the CDC’s screening guidelines to
be cost-effective [8,9], as well as the cost-effectiveness of other
testing policies [11]. Nevertheless, government budget outlays
for the CDC’s policy are unknown. We projected the budget
impact of doubling testing rates from once every 10 years to once
every 5 years. Although testing every 5 years does not perfectly
match the CDC recommendation, our aim was to project the
budget impact of the policy as it is likely to be implemented.
Expanded screening will increase the costs of HIV testing and
care to government programs by $2.7 billion over 5 years. This
increase is large in comparison to the annual RW budget ($2.1
billion per year) [20]. It is smaller relative to the total entitlement
budget for HIV care (annual federal budgets of $6.3 billion for
Medicaid and $3.2 billion for Medicare) [16,27]. In both current
practice and expanded screening strategies, HIV testing repre-
sents a small fraction of total costs. The downstream pathway of
costs triggered by expanded screening and the cost-shifting that
will occur between entitlement and discretionary programs are
important budget concerns.
Discretionary programs such as RW will be most affected by
expanded screening. Pharmaceutical costs will be the main driver
of budget increases, as antiretroviral medications represent
nearly three-fourths of lifetime HIV care costs [46]. An expanded
screening program will impose an additional pharmaceutical cost
to discretionary programs of $1.9 billion over the 5-year period,
which is equivalent to 25% of the current ADAP budget if it
remained constant during the time period. RW has been ﬂat-
funded since 2000 despite higher HIV case counts [57]. Congress
earmarks a portion of RW funds for ADAP and many states
supplement their federal allocations with local contributions
[20]. Nevertheless, budget constraints have already forced many
states to implement ADAP cost-containment strategies such as
wait lists, copayments, reduced drug formularies, and restricted
eligibility [17].
As the expanded screening program increases HIV care costs
to discretionary programs, costs to entitlement programs will
decrease slightly. Cost savings to entitlement programs will be
very small in the ﬁrst year but will increase over time. Some cost
savings are because of the earlier detection of cases, with averted
OIs and hospitalizations. Additionally, earlier detection will
cause cost-shifting from entitlement to discretionary programs.
On average, newly identiﬁed cases will incur fewer treatment
costs than previously diagnosed cases, owing to the fact that they
will tend to be younger and healthier, less likely to initiate anti-
retroviral therapy, and more likely to be initially assigned to
discretionary programs.
We project that an increase of $503 million in the budget for
government-ﬁnanced testing programs would be required to
implement expanded screening, which is larger than the $53
million budget increase proposed for all CDC HIV prevention
and surveillance work in the next ﬁscal year [58]. If expanded
screenings were implemented consistent with the CDC guide-
lines, the policy may not be feasible without additional funds
from state and local governments.
RW is scheduled for reauthorization later this year. Activists
argue that RW, particularly ADAP, is chronically underfunded
[59]; this is conﬁrmed by our results which show that even under
current rates of testing, projected discretionary pharmaceutical
costs surpass the ADAP budget. If expanded HIV screening
increases demand for discretionary programs as we project, RW
will be further underfunded and unable to cover the costs of
those eligible for services. Expanding Medicaid services to low-
income individuals who have not yet progressed to AIDS may
alleviate some demand for RW [16]. Congress has intermittently
considered—but not enacted—the Early Treatment for HIV Act,
which would give states the option to extend Medicaid beneﬁts
(T. Westmoreland, pers. comm.). Although entitlement programs
generally respond more readily to increased demand, it may be
politically challenging to enact legislation to shift costs from
discretionary to entitlement programs. Policymakers may want
to consider the downstream care costs of expanded HIV screen-
ing as they deliberate RW’s reauthorization.
Limitations
One set of assumptions may have underestimated costs. We did
not account for new drugs or technologies, or future changes in
treatment guidelines toward earlier initiation of antiretroviral
therapy, all of which may increase care costs. We assumed that
privately insured individuals retain their coverage, are not under-
insured, and are ineligible for government-funded care. We
further assumed a constant percentage of newly identiﬁed indi-
viduals with private or VA coverage. Nevertheless, as the epi-
demic continues to move disproportionately into underserved
populations, fewer new cases will have existing coverage. Indi-
viduals with private insurance may transition to public programs
as they exhaust their beneﬁts or age. Additionally, the weak
economy has increased the number of individuals eligible for
government programs, as individuals lose employer-based cover-
Figure 2 Projected pharmaceutical costs (in mil-
lions) to US discretionary programs under
current practice and expanded screening, 2009 to
2013, compared to current AIDS Drug Assistance
Program (ADAP) budget.
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age [60]. It may be infeasible for government-funded HIV testing
centers to exclude individuals with existing coverage. We
addressed these limitations through a sensitivity analysis in
which we increased the population eligible for government-
ﬁnanced testing and care. Our analysis did not include the budget
impact of testing and care costs for youth, even though the CDC
guidelines included this group. We also did not explicitly budget
the costs of scaling up outreach programs such as the National
HIV Testing and Mobilization Campaign [61], because the focus
of the CDC recommendations are routine screening in health-
care settings.
Other assumptions may have overestimated costs. We did not
model patients dropping out of care or discontinuing antiretro-
viral therapy. Results did not incorporate ﬁnancial beneﬁts of
preventing HIV transmission to potential partners. Although any
reduction in the number of secondary infections will likely reduce
long-term treatment costs, the magnitude of these cost reductions
over a 5-year horizon may not be perceptible [10]. We did not
account for potential economies of scale with higher testing rates.
Our data sources have several limitations. First, it is difﬁcult
to obtain precise population estimates of HIV-infected individu-
als in the VA. Second, although HIVRN includes sites from
multiple regions, its data may not be nationally representative.
Third, existing observational data do not allow us to assess
whether the mix of unaware and aware cases differs by insurance
status.
Another limitation is our failure to report year-by-year
changes in the demographic composition (e.g., age and sex) of
new HIV cases identiﬁed. These would provide a fuller descrip-
tion of the impact of alternative screening strategies.
Our analysis ignores the fact that individuals self-select into
HIV testing. There is reason to believe that there exists a popu-
lation of individuals who chronically refuse HIV testing. This
group might be large if the CDC guidelines were attempted in
earnest. In the emergency department context, for example, it is
hard to test more than 10% to 20% of potentially eligible
patients [40,53]. Differences in risk characteristics between refus-
ers and accepters are currently unknown. Furthermore, there are
limited data from these settings on test acceptance conditional on
prior refusal. The budget impact of hard-to-test populations
warrants further analysis.
All budgets were estimated on an aggregate national basis,
rather than to speciﬁc states. Because Medicare is a federal
program, administrative decisions are often made at the national
level. In contrast, RW and Medicaid are primarily administered
by states. Consequently, there is substantial interstate variation in
program management and service delivery. Variation in eligibility
for RW and Medicaid may result in cost-shifting across these
programs at the state level. Additionally, the actual unit cost of
services and medications to government programs differs nation-
ally due to the variation in pharmaceutical prices obtained by
state ADAPs, the extent to which state programs pay insurance
premiums to fund individuals’ care rather than incurring direct
costs, client cost-sharing, and reimbursement rates to providers
[17,62]. We ignored interstate variation because our goal was to
predict aggregate US costs, rather than the budget impact for
speciﬁc states. Assessing the budget impact of interstate differ-
ences in program administration is an important area of future
research.
Finally, the budget impact of expanded HIV screening may be
inﬂuenced by the recent health reform legislation. Nearly all US
residents living with HIV will be insured after 2014. Those below
133% of the federal poverty level will be eligible for Medicaid,
and the remainder will most likely be enrolled in the insurance
exchange, have employer-based coverage, be enrolled in Medi-
care, or have access through federally qualiﬁed health centers. We
anticipate that RW budgets will be affected. Although our analy-
sis is relevant to current decision-making, this major policy
change warrants future research.
Conclusions
Expanded screening can identify new HIV cases and facilitate
early entry to care; treating these individuals will also increase
budget requirements for government programs by $2.7 billion.
The burden will fall disproportionately on discretionary pro-
grams, because persons identiﬁed with HIV early are less likely to
be immediately eligible for entitlement programs. Expanded HIV
screening will not meet early treatment goals unless government
programs have sufﬁcient budgets to conduct testing and provide
care for newly identiﬁed cases.
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